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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
- vs -

RICHARD EARL LANCASTER,

Case No.
10787

Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from a verdict of guilty by a
Jury and a sentence to one year in the county jail
on a charge of involuntary manslaughter.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with involuntary
manslaughter in the Third District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, convicted by a jury, and
sentenced by the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow,
Judge, to one year in the county jail as provided by
law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests that the jury verdict and
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the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 8, 1965, Bobby Davis, the fiveyear-old stepson of appellant was rushed to the L.D.
S. Cottonwood Hospital where, after efforts to revive
him failed, he was pronounced dead. The cause of
death was determined to be aspiration of vomitus in
the lungs resulting in asphyxiation (R.80).
Prior to his death the deceased had been locked
in the bathroom all day as the result of disciplinary
action (R.96). He was thereafter told to bathe before
dinner. Apparently appellant decided that the child
was holding his breath while in the bathtub as he
had done before and determined to give the child
a whipping to stop him from holding his breath
(R.97). Ferris Andrus, Captain in the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office, testified that appellant admitted hitting the child and that he didn't recall how
many times he hit him (R.97).
Dr. Horne, the physician on duty at the Cottonwood Hospital when the child was brought in, testified that the deceased had extensive bruises on his
head, neck, thorax, buttocks, and extremitites. The
scrotum was bruised and small amounts of blood
appeared on the buttocks (R. 63-65).
Dr. Shelley Swift, pathologist whose qualifications were stipulated, performed an autopsy on the
deceased the next day. He found numerous bruises
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and superficial abrasions on the body confined
chiefly to the right side of the face, the right side of
the forehead and the right ear. Extensive brusises
and abrasions were found on the buttocks and the
backs of the legs. The scrotum and base of the penis
were also bruised (R. 79).
In response to the question, "Do you have an
opinion based on reasonable medical certainty as
to the connection between the external trauma in
this case and the vomitus in the bronchial tubes?"
Dr. Swift testified as follows:
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Doctor, what is that opinion?
A. Well, it's not uncommon to find association between
injury and vomitus, particularly in certain parts of
the body. This is seen very commonly in children
that they will vomit following injury of many types.
Now, this is not only predicated by trauma, but, also,
influenced by emotional disturbance and so on associated with the trauma. Now, obviously I can't point
my finger to any finding in the autopsy showing connection between the two. This is merely an opinion.

Q. What is your opinion?
A. That there's a connection. A healthy, normal, child
does not vomit and aspirate.
Q. Then correct me if I'm wrong in stating your opinion,

Doctor: Is it your opinion that there is a connection
between the external trauma that you observed and
the aspiration?
(Objections by defendant and argument by prosecutor. Objections overruled.)

A. The Witness: I believe there's a connection.

Q. (By Mr. Lewis) Doctor, do you have an opinion as
to whether or not the cause of death relates to the
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external trauma?
(Objection by defendant overruled.)
A. The Witness: I believe that the death is due indirectly to the external trauma, not directly.
Q. Would you explain what you mean by "indirectly"?

A. If the cause of death, of course, is due to the aspiration of the vomitus, which I feel is indirectly connected with the external trauma, that the actual
trauma itself is not sufficient to cause death (R.8284).

Doctor Swift further testified that all the factors
of the trauma would not incapacitate a normal child
(R.85); that aspiration of vomitus may be caused by
any emotional upset (R.86-87); that death would
probably not result from that amount of trauma
alone; and that if the child hadn't aspirated the vomitus, death would probably not have resulted from
the trauma (R.87).
Doctor Swift attributed the cause of death to
the fact that a child crying must exhaust itself of air.
In the instant case the child had to breath before it
had completely expelled the vomitus. (R.88).
On cross examination, Dr. Swift testified that he
could not state with medical certainty what caused
the regurgitation (R.92). On redirect he stated that
it was his opinion that the cause of death resulted
from aspiration of vomitus brought about by the trauma of the body (R.93).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO GO
TO THE JURY.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT IN ORDER TO FIND
THE DEFENDENT GUILTY OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, THEY MUST FIND THAT DEATH WAS
THE FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCE OF DEFENDANT'S ACTS.

While these two points of argument are technically separate, the facts and applicable law lend
themselves to combining both points in one discussion.
Respondent submits that the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that appellant caused
the death of deceased while committing an unlawful
act not amounting to a felony. It is further submitted
that the issue of foreseeability is immaterial to a
charge of involuntary manslaughter where death
occurs as the result of a commission of an unlawful
act which was made illegal for the purpose of protecting the safety and security of others.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-5 (2) (1953 defines involuntary manslaughter as the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice:
" . . . in the commission of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony, or in the commission of a
lawful act which might produce death in an unlaw-
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ful manner or without due caution and circumspection."

In instruction No. 6 requested by appellant, the
trial court gave the above statute in defining "involuntary manslaughter."
In instruction No. 10, the jury was told:
". . . a parent or a person in loco parentis, or in
place of a parent, does not commit the crime of assault or battery in chastising a child, if such chastisement is conducted with due care and circumspection."

In instruction No. 12, the jury was told:
" ... When there is a question of whether or not a
person conducted himself without due caution ancl
circumspection, the jury must answer the question
in the light of all the surrounding circumstances for
the term "due caution and circumspection" is a
relative term and the amount of caution required
under the law varies in accordance with the nature
of the acts done, the type of instrumentality, if any,
being handled or used, the surrounding circumstances, and the danger that could be apprehended.

Instruction No. 10 submitted to the jury the
question of whether appellant exceeded the limits
of parental authority to chastise a child. On finding
that appellant did exceed such limits the jury could
thereupon find that appellant had committed the
crimes of assault and battery. See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-7-1, -1, -3 (1953) defining the crimes of assault
and battery and Utah Code Ann. §~ 76-7-2, -4 (1953)
making the crimes of assult and battery misdemeanors. Certainly the evidence supports this find-
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ing by the jury.
In State v. Straight, 136 Mont. 255, 347 P.2d 482
(1959), the defendant had been caring for the children of his cousin and had permission to spank the
children. The defendant had given the 29 month old
baby of his cousin a "spanking" with a belt. The
evidence presented to the jury showed that the
child's body was bruised black and blue. The examining physician testified that he found brusises two
inches long and one inch wide on the child's chest
and lower abdomen; that his buttocks and legs were
bruised, his penis scratched and swollen, and his
scrotum scratched. In affirming the conviction the
Court held that it was not unlawful for a parent or
authorized person to use force or violence in a reasonable manner and moderate in degree but that it
was up to the jury to determine from the facts and
circumstances of each individual case whether the
manner is reasonable and moderate, and if the jury
determines that such is not the case, then the jury
may go on to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish the assault.
In State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App. 6, 406 P.2d 208
(1965) the court held that corporal punishment of a
child by his parent is permissible, but the use of immoderate or excessive physical violence against a
child by a parent for correction or discipline purposes is an aggravated assault and battery.

In State v. Cobo. 90 Utah 89 at 97, 60 P.2d 952
at 956 (1939) this Court in reversing a conviction for
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voluntary manslaughter said:
We believe the great weight of authority is that an
unintentional killing, resulting from an unlawful
assault and battery which in and of itself is not of
a character to cause death, is held to constitute involuntary manslaughter under statutes such as ours.
See 29 C. J. 1150, § 137, and cases cited.
It is quite clear from all the evidence that the death
... resulted from an unlawful assault and battery,
not of a character of itself likely to cause death,
and that death unintentionally resulted. The evidence as disclosed by the record would not warrant
finding that the defendant was guilty of anything
more than involuntary manslaughter.

29 C. J. Homicide§ 137 at 1152 applies the above
cited rule to cases where death is unintentionally
caused in the correction or punishment of a child if
the correction is immoderate but not manifestly
dangerous to life, since under the circumstances, it
is an assault and battery. See also 40 C.J.S. Homicide
§ 58 at 920:
It is involuntary manslaughter at common law and
under statutes declaratory thereof where one unintentionally kills another in the commission of an
unlawful act not amounting to a felony or naturally dangerous to human life. In determining whether
a homicide was committed by a person while engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor, while he
must have had an intent to commit the act which
constitutes the misdemeanor, it is not necessary
that he shall have intended to violate the law. The
degree of negligence, if any, is not important as
an element of involuntary manslaughter based on
an unlawful act.

In the case of Regina v. Towers. 12 Cox's Cr. C.
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530 (1874) where the defendant struck a 12 year old
girl holding a small child in her arms, the child became frightened, went into convulsions, lingered
on for about six weeks and died. The court found
that sufficient facts had been established to allow
the case to go to the jury on the charge of involuntary manslaughter. Justice Denman said of the trial
judge:
. . . He should leave it to the jury to say whether
the death of the child was caused by the unlawful
act of the prisoner, or whether it was not so indirect
as to be in the nature of accident. This case was
different from other cases of manslaughter, for here
the child was not a rational agent, and it was so
connected with the girl that an injury to the girl
became almost in itself an injury to the child.
***It might be that in this case, unusual as it was,
on the principal of common law, manslaughter had
been committed by the prisoner. The prisoner committed an assault on the girl, which is an unlawful act, and if that act, in their judgment, caused
the death of the child i.e., that the child would not
have died but for that assault-they might find the
prisoner guilty of manslaughter. He called their
attention to some considerations that bore some
analogy to this case. This was one of the new cases
to which they had to apply old principles of law.
It was a great advantage that it was to be settled by
a jury, and not by a judge. If he were to say, as a
conclusion of law that murder could not have been
caused by such an act as this, he might have been
laying down a dangerous precedent for the future;
for, to commit a murder, a man might do the very
same thing this man had done. . . . Then arose the
question, which would be for them to decide, whether this death was directly the result of the prisoner's unlawful act-whether they thought that the
prisoner might be held to be the actual cause of the
child's death, or whether they were left in doubt
upon that upon all the circumstances of the case.
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After referring to the supposition that the convulsions were brought on owing to the child teethim·
he said that, even though the teething might ha~~
had something to do with it, yet if the man's act
brought on the convulsions or brought them to more
dangerous extent, so that death would not have resulted otherwise, then it would be manslaughter.
If, therefore, the jury thought that the act of the
prisoner in assaulting the girl was entirely unconnected with it, that the death was not caused by
it, but by a combination of circumstances, it would
be accidential death and not manslaughter."

The reasoning of Lord Denman was followed in
Ex parte Heigho, 18 Idaho 566, 110 Pac. 1029, 1031
(1910), where the defendant assaulted the deceased's
son-in-law while wearing a pistol in her presence.
Testimony of the physician, who attended her and
had performed a post mortem, determined that deceased had aneurism of the ascending aorta, which
had ruptured causing her death. The physician
further testified that excitement was one of three
principle causes which would produce such a result.
The Court held:
It was not necessary in order to convict the prisoner
that it should appear that his actual personal violence was the sole and immediate cause of the death
of the deceased. If his violence so excited the terror
of the deceased that she died from the fright, and
she would not have died except for the assault, then
the prisoner's act was in law the cause of her death.

In the instant case the facts are much stronger.
It is not disputed that appellant "whipped" deceased. The evidence supports the finding that appellant
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exceeded the limits of parental authority to chastise.
Respondent submits that the evidence was sufficient
to allow the jury to find that appellant caused the
death of deceased while committing an assault and
battery upon his person. It is immaterial that the
trauma itself was insufficient to cause death where
death results from an unlawful act.
Respondent submits that the purpose of the involuntary manslaughter statute is to reduce homicide resulting from unlawful acts. State v. Messely,
126 Mont. 62, 244 P.2d 1054 (1952).

In State v. Wheeler, 70 Idaho 455, 220 P.2d 887
(1950) the court said that where one commits an act
expressly forbidden by law and thereby causes the
death of another, he may be convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Thus, where an act is condemned or made a crime by statute and the doing of such
unawful act results in the death of another such
result amounts to involuntary manslaughter. See
State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1939).

In State v. McNichols, 188 Kan. 582, 363 P.2d 467
(1961) the court held that it is sufficient to sustain a
conviction for manslaughter in the fourth degree
when a defendant charged with the offense caused
the death of a human being while committing a
crime amounting to a misdemeanor denounced by
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statute which was for the purpose of protecting human life and safety, where the death would not
have resulted except for the unlawful conduct.

In State v. Frazier, 339 Mo. 966, 98 S.W.2d 707
(1936) the court sustained a manslaughter conviction
on the ground that since assault and battery are
crimes it need not be established that death is the
natural and probable result of the act; that it was
factually caused thereby is sufficient.

It will be seen that in none of the above cases
was foreseeability of death an \ssue. In State v.
Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1939) the language
would seem to preclude foreseeability as an issue
where the unintentional killing results from an unlawful assault and battery, which was not of a character likely to cause death. The same result appears
to have reached in Wheeler, McNichols, and Frazier,
cited above.
Appellant cites Copeland v. State, 154 Tenn. 7,
285 S. W. 565 (1926) for the proposition that death
must be in the "natural probable consequence" of
the unlawful act. Copeland is not a point. The circuit
court found that Copeland was not violating any
statute. It is conceeded that where an involuntary
manslaughter is grounded solely on negligence,
foreseeability may be an issue. But where it is

1
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grounded on violation of a statute for the protection of human life, foreseeability is not controlling.
In Copeland the court reversed and remanded the
case:
... for the failure of the trial court to charge that,
if death did not result from Copeland's violation of
statute, there could be no conviction, unless the
boy's death was the reasonable and probable result
of Copeland's negligent and reckless act ...

It should be noted that Copeland v. State is an
automobile homicide case and as will be noted below such cases usually require a higher degree of
culpability.

There are Utah cases which hold that the "unlawful act" sufficient to satisfy the involuntary manslaughter statute must not only be an unlawful act
not amounting to a felony, it must also be
reckless conduct evincing a marked disregard for
the safety of others. State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180,
91 P.2d 457 (1939); State v. Barker, 113 Utah 514, 192
P.2d 723 (1948); State v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144
P.2d 290 (1943). These cases can be distinguished
from the instant case in that they concern automobile homicide. It seems that Utah law requires ,as a
matter of public policy, a higher degree of culpability for automobile homicide.
Respondent submits that even were this higher
degree of culpability required in this case, it is sat-
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isfied by the facts of this case. Instruction No. 12
allowed the jury to find that appellant acted without due care and circumspection. From the testimony of Doctors Horne and Swift the jury would be
justified in concluding that appellant not only exceeded the limits of parental authority to discipline
a child, but that the beating was so severe as to
amount to "conduct evincing a reckless and marked
disregard for the safety of the deceased."
Appellant alleges that the evidence in this case
is not sufficient to allow the jury to do more than
speculate as to the cause of the regurgitation. He
points out that Dr. Switf testified that many things fear, anger, tantrums, as well as pain - could have
caused regurgitation.
Appellant ignores the expert testimony of Dr.
Swift to the effect that it was his opinion that there
was a connection between the external trauma and
the aspiration. (R.83-84) Dr. Swift testified that the
trauma brought about the regurgitation and that the
child had to breathe before he had completely expelled the vomitus. Certainly this testimony is
stronger than mere speculation.
In State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208 at 213, 357
P.2d at 187 (1960), this court held that:
. . . a qualified expert is permitted to express an
opinion even though other experts equally qualified
may reach an opposite conclusion. In such case
the weight to be given to such opinion is for the
jury to determine.
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It is submitted that the expert testimony of Dr.
Swift was sufficient to allow the jury to find that the
trauma caused the regurgitation and aspiration of
vomitus and that such finding was based on more
than mere speculation.
Appellant relies on Witt v. Commonwealth, 304
Ky. 818, 202 S.W.2d 634 (1947) to support his contention that where circumstantial evidence is relied on
to establish the cause of death, a conviction for involuntary manslaughter cannot be sustained. Respondent submits that Witt, is not in point. In Witt
the testimony of the doctor was that death could
have been caused either by blows producing the
wounds or by an over-indulgence in alcohol; he
had no opinion nor could he determine which was
the cause of death. In this case the jury could do no
more than speculate.
Appellant contends that the prosecution did not
prove how the brusises on the deceased' s scrotum
and penis were inflicted and that the admission into
evidence of photographs showing these injuries was
err and necessarily prejudicial and inflamatory.
In the instant case respondent is charged with
involuntary manslaughter resulting from child beating. It is submitted that pictures tending to show the
extent of such a beating are admissable into evidence notwithstanding whatever prejudicial effect
they may have had.
It is well established that it is within the discret-
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ion of the trial court to decide whether the probative
value of a particular photograph outweighs its possible prejudicial effect. People v. Burbaker. 53 Cal.2d
37. 346 P.2d 8 (1959).
In Monge v. People. 158 Colo. 224, 406 P.2d 674
(1965) the court held that photographs are not inadmissible merely because they bring vividly to jurors
the details of a shocking crime or that they could
arouse passion or prejudice.
In Cody v. State. Okl. Cr. 361 P.2d 307 (1961) the
court held that photographs were admissible where
they illustrate or clarify some issue of the case and
are relevant and a faithful production of what they
purport to reproduce.
Respondent submits that the photographs in the
instant case were relevant to the issue of the extent
to which appellant beat the deceased. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing these photographs into evidence.
Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in
not distinguishing the two breakdowns of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-30-5(2) (1953), into its two component
parts. The instruction complained of was submitted
by appellant.
It is submitted that appellant cannot write error
into the record and then assign it is error on appeal.
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Hightower v. State, 62 Ariz. 35, 158 P.2d 156 (1945);
People v. Suggs, 142 C.A.2d 142, 297 P.2d 1039 (1956).

In State v. Thompson. 110 Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153
(1946) this court held that giving erroneous instructions containing limitations similar to limitations
contatined in defendant's instructions was not reversible error.
In State v. Evans. 88 Ariz. 364, 356 P.2d 1106
(1960) the court held that the reviewing court would
not consider as grounds of error instruction requested by the defendant.
CONCLUSION
The evidence was sufficient to allow the jury
to find appellant caused the death of the deceased
while committing an unlawful act not amounting to
a felony and that the trial court correctly denied
appellant's motion for a directed verdict.
The trial court correctly denied appellant's request for instructions as to foreseeability, as forseeabiilty was not in issue in this case.
It is respectfully submitted that the verdict of

the jury and the judgment of the trial court should
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be affirmed.
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